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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE NEW RESPONSE TO DISASTERS 
 
Natural disasters are an expected, albeit uncontrolled part of history, and will 
continue and possibly worsen in the future.  Communities have been able to rebuild 
after devastating damages and fatal disasters through recovery and relief efforts 
that have focused on what’s essential- survival and basic necessities.  The 
humanitarian focus that has characterized disaster response is changing, along with 
the way the government responds to large-scale disasters.   
Since there have been natural disasters, there has also been some sort of 
disaster response, although initial responses to earthquakes, tornadoes and the like 
resemble few aspects of disaster response today. Since the inception of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979, the role of the military has grown 
more remarkable and substantial, almost to the point that we increasingly see the 
military as first responders (Burby 2006, Hofmann and Hudson 2009, Mannion 2006, 
Marek 2005). 
A much newer phenomenon than military involvement is the focus on 
security and crime, and one objective of this study is to show through literature that 
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this is true. In recent years, disaster response has been plagued with the perception 
that looting and violent crimes commonly take place in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster (Tierney et al, 2006), and that these security problems need to be addressed 
first to keep society and neighborhoods that are affected safe. In fact, much of the 
reason military personnel and troops are called upon now is to deal with threats to 
security after a natural disaster, and this seems especially true for private military 
companies that are contracted by the government. Securing neighborhoods and 
attempting to quell criminal activity have taken precedent over getting victims of 
natural disasters out of the area and to proper shelter with amenities they need. 
This is a problematic trend in society today, where the failed responses on the part 
of the government have meant private sector companies and individuals in 
communities are expected to compensate for this lack of regard.  
Current literature on the militarization of disaster relief focuses on the 
expansion of powers of federal government, with a broader role for the military 
because they have the manpower and resources to be of great assistance (Johnson 
2004, Alvarez 2005, Fischer et al 2006). The supplies the military has at its disposal 
are not overlooked when it comes to helping in times of disaster. The military has 
always been involved to some extent, but only as support to local and state 
authorities, as this is all the law will allow. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 has been 
at odds with the reality of situations, as the military has not only been increasingly 
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used as responders, but used more as security detail. White House Reports on 
Hurricane Katrina, sociological journals, and books ranging from Militarizing the 
American Criminal Justice System (Kraska, 2001) to Acts of God (Steinberg, 2006) are 
examples of sources used to accumulate information. 
As has been the case in recent history, citizens often must bear the brunt of 
losses from these natural disasters (Burby, 2006), which means disaster response in 
the new millennium has a neoliberal slant that was previously nonexistent to 
disaster recovery operations. Victims in communities that have been stricken by 
hurricanes, tornadoes and other common natural disasters are expected to, for the 
most part, not only fend for themselves but also cleaning up after and rebuilding 
after the disaster.   
This new liberalism is based on corporate autonomy, keeping businesses from 
feeling negative impacts while a “free market” mentality is applied for individual 
citizens (Steinberg, 2006).  A prime example of neo-liberalism at work would be the 
poor and underprivileged New Orleans citizens who had no way out of the city 
before Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005.  There were no plans in place to help with 
evacuations, which is why many stayed behind.  
All of the literature considered from different areas of interest builds a 
foundation upon which theories and examples can be discussed.  The aim was to 
coordinate the information in a way that not only exemplifies that militarization of 
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disaster response is a real phenomenon, but also one that should be studied in 
criminal justice because of the implications to our field of study. It has become clear 
since the turn of the century that disaster response is no longer about helping 
victims and recovery efforts, but about keeping people “safe” and minimizing the 
risk of crime in what is considered an area in a disarray with no rule of law being 
enforced.  
Research will showcase a turn of events that has been taking place, and how 
the concentration of disaster response is changing in our modern society as we 
become ever more concerned with crime and keeping ourselves safe and out of 
harm’s way.  This mentality has paved the way for private military companies and 
the military itself to get more involved in responding to natural disasters and gaining 
more power in controlling the neighborhoods and people affected by unforeseen 
catastrophes. 
This research is exploring a phenomenon previously unexamined within the 
field of criminal justice studies. Many have written extensively on the subjects of 
disaster relief and militarization concepts within many disciplinary fields. Secondary 
document analysis was undertaken using a wide variety of sources, including 
government reports, peer reviewed journal articles, and newspapers and editorials. 
The task undertaken in this research will be to synthesize as much relevant 
information as could be attained in order to build a theoretical framework that can 
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help shed light on the militarization of disaster response and how it specifically 
relates to crime, using Hurricane Katrina as a case study and example of the 
phenomenon.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The primary methods used in this research are a secondary analysis of written 
sources, as well as theoretical synthesis of information. The goal of this is to cite 
instances and circumstances that prove the fact that disaster response has changed 
to increasingly work from the military approach, and then theorize on why this has 
happened and what it means for criminal justice.  
Analytical techniques used were perusing the relevant literature by using 
search engines and the database JSTOR.  Various terms and words were used to 
maximize the documents that could be found, including terms on “militarization”, 
“disaster response”, “crime and Hurricane Katrina”, “disasters and crime”, and other 
combinations. The articles that were found to be relevant were examined for 
common themes or for precise examples to be used.  It was also important to check 
government websites, for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to gain basic 
knowledge and understanding to be used so that a general overview of disaster 
response could be provided.  
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As was mentioned, the theoretical section is included to answer the question 
of why disaster response has become so much more focused on criminal behavior in 
the aftermath of a catastrophe, and why the military has been used more as an 
unofficial police force.  It is important to understand not just that this is a new 
phenomenon taking place and that it has significant meaning for the field of crime 
and justice studies, but to consider why it is taking place now. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE HISTORY OF MILITARIZATION AND DISASTER RESPONSE 
 
Defining the concepts of militarization and militarism is essential to seeing 
how this has been taking place in the realm of disaster response. Militarization refers 
to a means of implementing the ideology of militarism, but applying those elements 
of the military to a different agency or situation (Kraska, 2001).  Merriam-Webster 
dictionary defines militarism as “predominance of the military class or its ideals”. 
The focus on problems is shifted so that they are seen as easily amenable through  
military efforts. The American public views the military as a problem solver that 
succeed in any mission.  They are perceived as efficient, orderly, and disciplined, and 
the military itself is willing to keep up this image, as it makes them socially useful.  
There are four indicators to look for with militarization- material, cultural, 
organizational, and operational (Kraska, 2001).  Material refers to weapons and 
technology that might be used in responses.  Cultural aspects are indicated by 
language used to describe what has happened in militaristic terms.  After Hurricane 
Katrina, New Orleans was referenced in terms of restoring law and order. 
Organizational would be how military arrangements are deployed., whether it be as 
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first responders, for support to civil authority, or for security purposes. Operational 
is how the militant agencies and groups carry out their orders, as oftentimes the use 
of force or threat of force is a method used. The ideology of the military is strong, 
and the social environment must be open to accepting this. 
As will be evidenced throughout this research, officials have long since been 
calling for greater military intervention in disasters. The public view of the military as 
saviors who help restore order and prevent disaster victims from causing crime is 
common. This is what Chalmers Johnson (2004) refers to when he writes, “certainly 
one of the clearest signs of militarism in America is the willingness of some senior 
officers and civilian militarists to meddle in domestic policing”.  
The authority of the federal government and the military in disaster response 
used to follow traditional protocol (Anderson, 1970). There were role expectations 
and norms to adhere to, and even when the military was called upon it was strictly in 
support to civil authorities. They waited until they were invited to help, unless the 
need was known and apparent, putting them under pressure to respond, which is 
what the framers intended (Anderson 1970, Dunlap Jr.2001). 
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was passed with the direct intention of 
limiting the ability of the federal government to use the military for law enforcement 
purposes. It does not apply to the National Guard or Coast Guard (Trebilcock, 2000)., 
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and the formality and strict separation has deteriorated over the years.  When it 
comes to natural disasters, Trebilcock (2000) writes:  
Federal military personnel may also be used pursuant to the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C., 
section 5121, in times of natural disaster upon request from a state governor. In such an 
instance, the Stafford Act permits the president to declare a major disaster and send in 
military forces on an emergency basis for up to ten days to preserve life and property. 
While the Stafford Act authority is still subject to the criteria of active versus passive, it 
represents a significant exception to the Posse Comitatus Act’s underlying principle that 
the military is not a domestic police force auxiliary. 
Given the supposed lack of public order after Hurricane Katrina, President 
Bush recommended revising this law so that the military could restore law and 
order. These changes were implemented in the John Warner National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.  This gave the commander in chief the 
authority to call on the armed forces to “restore public order and enforce laws of the 
United States when, as a result of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious 
public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition... the 
President determines that... domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that 
the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of maintaining 
public order” (H.R. 5122, 2006). Although it has since been repealed (in 2008), this 
alarming trend of using the military as police for security purposes after a natural 
disaster, and passing laws to make this acceptable, has led to the expectation that 
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“disaster relief has become a core, but rarely acknowledged, mission of the United 
States military” (Juul, 2010).  
Previously in United States history, disaster relief has been primarily a local 
and state issue, but has become increasingly more federalized over the years 
(Buchalter, 2007). The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and the Stafford Act 
(amended from the 1988 Disaster Relief Act), both authorize federal authorities to 
take action after a natural disaster strikes should the President feel he or she is 
acting in the interests of saving human lives. Despite all of this, the military is still 
only supposed to act in support to civil authorities, and traditionally have been called 
in as such.   
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was an organization 
created in 1979 specifically to coordinate disaster response when it was formally 
requested by state governments.  A regularized system of disaster relief had already 
been implemented by the 1960s, due to massive natural disasters such as Hurricane 
Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Carla in 1962, and the Alaskan Earthquake of 1964. The 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 established the process for presidential disaster 
declarations (FEMA, 2011). When President Carter made the executive order in 1979 
to merge and coordinate the fragmented disaster relief operations, and “civil 
defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the Defense 
Department’s Defense Civil Preparedness Agency” (FEMA, 2011). The influence of 
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militarism, then, has always been an inherent part of disaster response and disaster 
response agencies.  
The creation of FEMA was prompted by criticism of how the federal 
government handled emergency management (Steinberg, 2006). Many early leaders 
of the agency had military experience, including Director Louis Giuffrida, who 
attended U.S. Army War College and served in the National Guard. During the next 
decade, FEMA developed a plan under the guidance of Colonel Oliver North to 
prevent nuclear attack on the United States. As Steinberg notes, “between 1982 and 
1991, FEMA spent almost $3 billion developing equipment and plans for either 
protecting government officials during nuclear war or dealing with other aspects of 
national security. During the same time, it spent just $243 million on planning for 
natural disaster.”  This led to disconcerting and mediocre responses to natural 
disasters such as Hurricane Hugo in South Carolina.   
After Hurricane Andrew hit Florida in 1992, FEMA was strongly criticized for 
its slow response to the disaster. This led to an effort by the federal government to 
improve the agency, and give it a more definitive mission.  President Clinton 
nominated James L. Witt as the new director, the first one in FEMA’s 14-year history 
who had experience as a state emergency manager.  Resources were allocated 
differently, from civil defense to preparedness and disaster relief and recovery 
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operations (FEMA, 2011). All of this was sidelined, however, after the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001.    
FEMA became refocused on issues of national security and preparedness 
after 9/11. (FEMA, 2011). FEMA’s Office of National Preparedness trained first 
responders to deal with weapons of mass destruction, billions of dollars were spent 
on homeland security, and finally in March of 2003, FEMA became a part of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  
The main focus of the DHS since its creation has been national security and 
terrorism, so natural disaster response preparedness efforts and mitigation plans 
were superseded by counter terrorism as the new homeland security focused 
organization developed plans based on terrorist disasters. Because all of the 
agencies within the DHS were interconnected, monies could be easily transferred 
from one to another, and FEMA began to lose funds. This made the agency less 
capable of carrying out planning and preparation for natural disasters. The focus was 
forced to change and concentrated only on relief efforts, which made FEMA seem to 
some the equivalent of a “federal firehouse” (Cooper and Block, 2006). 
FEMA being integrated with the Department of Homeland Security has been 
viewed as problematic by disaster response analysts. Fischer, et al (2006), 
commented, for example, that “while terrorism may occur again, we know 
hurricanes and other types of disasters will.”  It is also questionable, and reasonable 
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to wonder, on what has been accomplished by the serious focus on terrorism and 
security. The planning and preparation for natural disasters has become inadequate, 
and almost moot (Cooper and Block 2006, Gill 2007). 
Even in the days after Hurricane Katrina, terrorism was still on the minds of 
federal officials.  A document from the DHS entitled “How Terrorists Might Exploit a 
Hurricane” (2004) was circulated throughout federal agencies. This plan even noted 
that it was unlikely that terrorism could be an issue during a natural disaster, but 
went on to outline recommendations such as nationwide security and high security 
levels at shelters that would include identification checks. Those who took part in 
the Red Cell that organized this document included the U.S. Marine Corps -- another 
indicator of militarization.   
In 2002, United States Military Northern Command was established, which 
serves as an on-call federal response for disasters, its mission to protect the 
homeland. It officially serves as a support to civil authorities (limited by the Posse 
Comitatus Act), but also states that in case of a national emergency, the Air Forces 
Northern National Security Emergency Preparedness Directorate will gain control of 
the situation. They will coordinate defense support and provide command and 
control (Lendman, 2008).  
The National Response Plan, adopted in 2004, was a document outlining 
emergency response guidelines in the event of a catastrophic event.  Although it was 
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not just focused on natural disasters, FEMA was not consulted in drawing up of this 
plan.  The Rand Corporation, a counterterrorism thinktank, was contracted for the 
job.   The government, in regards to disasters, was focused only on terrorism, not 
the more likely to occur natural disasters. 
The White House Report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina, 
released in February 2006, also mentioned national security and 9/11 numerous 
times in the discussion on lessons learned from the natural disaster that leveled New 
Orleans. Since terrorism was at the forefront of topics discussed in disaster 
response, most funds were used for this purpose, making designing plans for 
preparing and mitigating damage from natural disasters nearly impossible.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
HURRICANE KATRINA: A CASE STUDY 
 
On August 29, 2005, the role of the federal government in response to 
natural disasters would face true scrutiny, and become one of the most inefficient 
disaster responses in recent history.  New Orleans was in the direct path of a 
Category 5 hurricane, and completely unprepared for the havoc the storm would 
unleash.  Hurricane Katrina, and the subsequent governmental response in New 
Orleans, will be used to exemplify the militarization of disaster response.  There was 
a marked difference in how relief operations were handled as compared to any 
disaster before.  
Three days before the hurricane made landfall, Louisiana governor Kathleen 
Blanco declared a state of emergency.  A federal emergency was declared a day 
later, as Blanco asked President Bush to do so, stating:  
 
I have determined that this incident is of such severity and magnitude that 
effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local 
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governments, and that supplementary Federal assistance is necessary to save 
lives, protect property, public health, and safety, or to lessen or avert the 
threat of a disaster. 
 
 This gave the federal government, including FEMA and the Department of 
Homeland Security, full authority in the disaster response to Hurricane Katrina.  A 
day before landfall, Mayor Ray Nagin declared a mandatory evacuation of New 
Orleans. Unable to leave the city because they lacked transportation, roughly 30,000 
citizens gathered at the Superdome. The Louisiana National Guard requested 700 
buses from FEMA to help with evacuations, but only 100 were sent (O’Brian and 
Bender, 2005). The next morning, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a category 4 
storm.  
Reports of water overflowing the levees, and the possibility they had been 
breeched, arose almost immediately. The devastation would remain to be seen at 
this time, but officials were aware of the unavoidable possibilities. In 2004, FEMA 
had funded and participated in a disaster simulation referred to as “Hurricane Pam”, 
which warned of the desolation that could become New Orleans, a city that has a 
vulnerable geographic landscape and lies below sea level.  Poor communication on 
whether or not the levees had actually broke hinted to poor preparedness for this 
predicted catastrophe.  The levees had in fact been breeched by late morning, as the 
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Times-Picayune reported, “A large section of the vital 17th Street Canal levee, where 
it connects to the brand new ‘hurricane proof’ Old Hammond Highway bridge, gave 
way late Monday morning in Bucktown after Katrina’s fiercest winds were well 
north.”  
 
Reports of crime and lawlessness surfaced almost immediately. The media 
nationwide began reporting on riots and looting happening in the affected areas, 
and alleging that citizens were being shot and raped, with gangs running around the 
Superdome menacing people.  Afterwards, it was revealed there were only eight 
gunshot victims total in New Orleans during the Hurricane Katrina rescue effort, and 
two of those were apparent suicides (Cooper and Block, 2006). As will be further 
discussed, disaster literature notes that crime and looting after natural disasters are 
rarely significant problems in the United States. Still, American citizens were on the 
outside looking in, wondering why the federal government had not responded to the 
crime issue earlier.  The Associated Press reported that fights and fired had broken 
out, corpses were laying out on the streets, and rescue helicopters and law 
enforcement officers were shot at, turning the situation even more desperate.  
Tierney and Bevc (2007) give an overview of how militarization began with the relief 
efforts in Louisiana: 
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In the response that followed the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, more than 
63,000  National Guard and active military personnel were deployed to assist 
in the response and recovery efforts of the Gulf region. Beyond routine tasks, 
such as search and rescue and the delivery of relief supplies, military 
personnel also operated outside their traditional areas of responsibility and 
were armed with loaded weapons to deal with socially constructed threats of 
urban insurgents and charged with restoring order. The Katrina catastrophe 
provided the justification for U.S. leaders to push for the militarization of 
disasters, even though the idea has many opponents and the rationales for 
expanding the role of the military are questionable.  
 
Thousands of fully armed troops, from the Coast Guard, National Guard, and 
Marines, were present to guard the streets of New Orleans, with assault rifles and 
hummers (Whitney 2005, Kouddous 2005). A 6 p.m. curfew was put into effect for all 
citizens, and no re-entry was allowed for residents who might be trying to return to 
the city, either to get belongings or search for loved ones. The Convention Center 
and Superdome were heavily guarded and locked down, complete with military 
checkpoints throughout the city (Scahill, 2005).  
Hurricane Katrina became a launch for military operations against United 
States citizens.  It has since been illustrated through eyewitness reports that New 
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Orleans police officers were told they were allowed to shoot looters (Shankman and 
Jennings, 2010). Ultimately, a total of eleven New Orleans residents were involved in 
shootings by officers.  
Aside from this, there was much confusion among law enforcement officials 
as to how much force should be used to stop looting, some citing martial law, and 
other refusing to adhere to the order. “Take back the city” and “regain control” were 
phrases used repeatedly and without consequence. Sally Forman, communications 
chief for Mayor Nagin, was quoted saying “The mayor said, ‘Let's stop the looting, 
let's stop the lawlessness and let's put our police officers on the streets so that our 
citizens are protected,” (Shankman and Jennings, 2010).  Many journalists and 
citizens were shocked to hear the order to shoot looters, especially since they posed 
no immediate or dangerous threat to the safety of others (Joyner 2005, Shankman 
and Jennings 2010).  
Related to looting are disaster myths (Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski, 2006) 
which frame social control and reactions from citizens. Classic disaster research 
shows that there are lower instances of deviant behaviors than during nondisaster 
time periods. The panic myth is a popularly held misconception about reactions 
during times of disaster, which assumes the public will react with great alarm. The 
authors mention Hurricane Katrina specifically, and how media coverage shifted 
from exhibiting the devastation to characterizing the disaster victims “as 
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opportunistic looters and violent criminals.”  New Orleans was referred to as a “war 
zone, drawing parallels between the conditions in that city and urban insurgency in 
Iraq.” What ensued was a military response based on the assumption that residents 
in New Orleans were out of control, dangerous, and deviant.  
Fischer noted a “looting frame” in disaster myths also (1998). It is a “most 
expected behavioral response” in times of disaster, with the media reporting on 
looting consistently. Troops are brought in to prevent these incidents and act as a 
social control. Oftentimes, if looting is rampant, it is merely a means for survival, 
with residents taking food and water, which is not being provided to them.  The 
social disorder that was commonly throught to plague New Orleans during this time 
was a social construction, and many citizens “with homes, property, and livelihoods 
gone, with no evidence of a functioning governmental system…without any idea of 
when help would arrive…might have understandably concluded they had to fend for 
themselves” (Tierney et al, 2006). 
Beyond the scope of property damage and theft were the reports of violent 
crimes. These stories of people robbing businesses and assaulting other disaster 
victims was a “clear influence” on disaster management decision making. Accounts 
of gunshot victims, rape of children, and gangs were proven groundless, but even 
during hurricane relief efforts, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin made safety from 
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crime a priority, ordering officials to go after lawbreakers, disregarding the fact that 
many victims were still stranded.  
Some news headlines were more representative and accurate (Fischer et al, 
2006): “No evidence shots fired at helicopters- post-Katrina rumor delayed rescue 
actions in New Orleans” (Hill and Spangler 2005); “Now the real looting begins: 
Purging the poor” (Klein 2005); and Exposed: Katrina urban legends- rumors of 
murder, mayhem debunked” (Gillin 2005) are a few examples.  Some have argued 
that if shots ever were fired at aircrafts, it was only to draw attention to themselves 
so they could be rescued. These exaggerated reports of crime delayed rescue 
missions that were fearful to enter the city.  
One cannot mention Hurricane Katrina without also noting the race factor.  
Minorities are often portrayed in stereotypical ways, and this was true for New 
Orleans. Black residents were labeled in captions as “looters” while white citizens 
were looking for supplies. Similarities begin to surface also between New Orleans 
post-Katrina and the American criminal justice system.  Young black men are 
disproportionately labeled as criminals and serve time in prison, creating a racial 
stereotype that is carried out even through gatekeepers just as law enforcement. 
The reaction to looters and resident of New Orleans (and the Ninth Ward 
specifically) shows this same racial myth, justifying law enforcement tactics because 
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of the threat to social order by “thugs” in the city (Niman 2005, Hartman and Squires 
2006, Elliott and Pais 2006). 
Given the concentration on criminal behavior and lawlessness and disorder, 
the reaction that came afterwards under the guidance of the federal government 
does not seem so surprising.  Soon after this natural disaster, one of the worst in the 
history of the United States, troops and private military personnel were called upon 
to restore law and order. Private military companies (PMC’s), such as Blackwater, 
were hired by the federal government, as well as business owners in New Orleans, to 
protect property enforce rule of law. The focus was on providing surveillance and 
ensuring that crime did not become an issue (Tierney 2007; Williams, 2008). 
Private military companies, also sometimes referred to as mercenaries, are 
hired contractors who provide security services. Many private business owners hired 
PMC’s such as Israeli Defense Forces and Blackwater to guard property (Scahill, 
2005). These companies “employ some of the most feared professional killers in the 
world accustomed to operating without worry of legal consequences and largely off 
the congressional radar” (Scahill, 2007). In an effort to avoid threatening the Posse 
Comitatus Act, the federal government was able to hire these mercenaries to police 
the streets of New Orleans as the military might do if they were able, their job being 
to secure the neighborhoods and confront criminals. 164 Blackwater troops were 
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hired directly by the Department of Homeland Security (Cooper and Block, 2006), 
and others were hired privately as well.  
This militarization of post-Katrina Louisiana was magnified by the fact that 
just five days after the hurricane, the number of Guardsmen and active military 
deployed tripled that of Hurricane Andrew (Tierney et al, 2006). Search and rescue 
mission “began to resemble military search and destroy missions” and the region 
was described as being similar to that of a war zone. After the military and police 
gained control, evacuees were searched and patted down like criminals for weapons 
and drugs. An army major general was quoted as saying, “once you put soldiers on 
the streets with M16s, things tend to settle down” (Tierney et al 2006, Alvarez 
2005). Special Forces were sent to New Orleans for the distinct purposes of security, 
including a 300 person military police unit (Alvarez, 2005).  
According to American Forces Information Service, the deployment of the 
military in response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest for any natural disaster in 
history (2005). DHS press secretary Russ Knocke was quoted as saying, “we could 
have had the military, for instance, fly over New Orleans early on to help us gain 
visibility on things- water levels and developing pockets of criminal activity” (Marek, 
2005). Shortly after recovery operations began in New Orleans the president made it 
clear that the challenges faced in confronting the response to this natural disaster 
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“requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces” (Marek, 
2005).  
A Disaster Assistance report from the United States General Accountability 
Office in 1993 foreshadowed what would happen over ten years later.  The report 
suggested that  “the roles, training, and doctrine military forces employ during 
disasters are similar to what they employ in performing their national security 
missions” during wartime. In Florida during Hurricane Andrew, it is noted, the Guard 
was primarily used to law enforcement, and reserves should be made more readily 
available for response to disasters.  
The Army Times reported in 2008 that the 3rd Infantry’s Brigade Combat 
Team in Iraq would be “redeployed at home as an on-call federal response force for 
natural or manmade emergencies and disasters” (Lendman, 2009). This goes along 
with the militaristic thinking in society and the perception that the military “proved 
to be the only federal entities capable of turning the president’s orders into prompt 
action on the ground” (Mannion, 2006) after Hurricane Katrina. This not only 
continues to improve the image of the military, but also provide training 
opportunities (Hoffman and Hudson, 2009), as they can use disaster response 
operations as practice for real deployment operations.  
The White House Report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina was 
released in 2006, citing lessons learned from the ordeal. The natural disaster is 
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related to 9/11 numerous times, in reference to citizens expecting a more timely 
response.  Terrorism and national security are also mentioned ostensibly in the 
report. Acts of terrorists and the wrath of nature are equated. A larger federal role in 
contingency planning for catastrophes is suggested, even though the federal 
government failed by all accounts.  
Public safety and security is covered in the report, where is it written that 
“most of the New Orleans police force was redirected from search and rescue 
missions to respond to the looting, detracting from the priority mission of saving 
lives”.  This admission by the government that police forces blatantly stopped search 
missions to deal with crime is momentous. Worthy of mentioning is how Hurricane 
Katrina was said to “cripple” the nation’s criminal justice system, with offenders not 
accounted for and on the lose. Criminal prosecutions were delayed and there was 
poor recordkeeping. Contrary to what is now known about the societal reaction of 
New Orleans, the White House report declares that “almost immediately following 
Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, law and order began to deteriorate”.  This is one of 
many assumptions on the part of the federal government.  Furthermore, the first 
person federally arrested after Hurricane Katrina (as a suspect for shooting at 
helicopters) is presumed guilty although the outcome is never divulged, and his 
given statement not shared, so we are expected to assume this was another case of 
deviant behavior in the disorderly neighborhoods.  
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Perhaps the most resounding recommendation is the most revealing- re-
establish FEMA as an agency separate from the Department of Homeland Security 
(Fischer, 2006). This would ensure money would be allocated for the agency, and 
instead of focusing only on an immediate disaster security-based response, plans 
could be organized for mitigation of damages from disasters and preparedness, 
much like what happened after Hurricane Andrew (although that never fully came to 
fruition).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THEORIZING ON WHY DISASTERS HAVE BECOME MILITARIZED  
IN MODERN TIMES 
 
It became evident after Hurricane Katrina that disaster response had taken 
on a life of its own, and the military was a primary leader in relief efforts. All of this 
was exemplified through the media and the response of the federal government, 
through focusing on crime and security to hiring mercenaries. What happened after 
Hurricane Katrina was at odds with disaster response protocol on not involving the 
military in policing efforts, and coming to the aid of American citizens. Naturally the 
most significant question to be asked is: why? 
Society today has become much more concerned with security and avoiding 
risk, assuming complete control is possible in our rapidly changing culture. This is 
what is known as late modernity, and refers to the current era we are in. This 
theoretical orientation will be used to explain, in part, why disaster response has 
changed so drastically.  
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One perspective in understanding late modernity are the neo-liberal policies 
the government is practicing today, which are embedded within disaster response as 
well.  FEMA has made it clear that victims of natural disasters in communities must 
be prepared to be on their own for the first 72 hours (Fischer, 2006). The White 
House report on Hurricane Katrina also mentions that the government alone cannot 
deliver all disaster relief, and has a section entitled “Citizen Preparedness”, which 
suggests that “civilians need to take responsibility for maximizing the probability 
that they will survive, should disaster strike”. Many citizens in New Orleans, 
however, lacked these means of survival.  They did not have access to transportation 
and the state did not have a contingency plan in place that would have mitigated 
damages. After the worst was over and residents had been evacuated to nearby 
states, they were left to fend for themselves still, relying instead on the graciousness 
of the Red Cross, United Way, and other charitable organizations. Problems are still 
rampant with FEMA claims and funding, with many not able to acquire enough to 
sustain themselves for any proper length of time. Individualism was given high 
priority during Hurricane Katrina, since the state had obviously failed, bringing neo-
liberalism to the limelight. Citizens are made to “bear the brunt of losses in disasters, 
local public officials often fail to take actions necessary to protect them” (Burby, 
2006). These burdens are not just physical and emotional, but financial.  
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Two paradoxes that entail the burden of the individual are the safe 
development paradox and the local government paradox (Burby, 2006). Safe 
development means the federal government makes a certain locality safe to build on 
and develop, which in turn makes them susceptible to disasters. Local government 
comes into play as they give inadequate attention to threats of disaster, such as the 
unwillingness in New Orleans to rebuild the levees. What results is catastrophe, and 
even though the government did nothing to prevent or alleviate damages, they also 
do nothing to amend any situation, leaving citizens like those of the lower ninth 
ward in New Orleans without homes and no property or belongings left to claim.  
In situations of high uncertainty, “organizations deploy science and 
technology in combination with a misplaced faith in their capabilities so as to 
redefine risks as more manageable and acceptable” (Williams, 2008). What we are 
left with are manufactured risks, making natural disasters seem controllable.  The 
focus is shifted from the fury of nature to the fury of man. Concentrations were on 
“providing surveillance and protective equipment” (Tierney 2006).  Accusations were 
rampant about looting when family members were simply searching for loved ones, 
and people were refused permission to leave the shelters, for fear letting them out 
on their own would result in more crime and chaos.  
Environmental matters are relegated secondary to social issues, even though 
natural disasters are not preventable, as “complex systems involve much uncertainty 
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and the unknown while the stakes are very high” (Williams 2008).  This is what 
instills fear in late modern society. Many practices are based on pre-modern notions 
of society, but modern society reacts differently, and an actuarial society rises. An 
emphasis is placed on “efficiency, minimizing risk, targeting hot-spots of potential 
danger, and prevention” (Kraska, 2004). In late modern society, we want the world 
to be as safe, secure, and predictable as possible, all within a “socially exclusive 
society”.  Populations are so consumed with avoiding danger and minimizing risk, 
that “those members of society that pose a potential danger are the excluded 
‘other’” (Kraska, 2004).  
This all explains why the reaction to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans 
happened.  When a natural disaster such as a hurricane strikes, it causes a panic 
because no one knows what to expect- the outcome is unknown and above all no 
one can tell when help will arrive, and in what form. Since we are already a risk 
aversive society, fearful of the unknown, sometimes we allow liberties to become 
eroded in exchange for a feeling of safety.  After a natural disaster, the feeling of 
uncertainty is magnified. Because society will go to extremes in terms of safety and 
security, allowing military personnel to get involved in disaster response seems 
acceptable, especially when it comes to dealing with crime. There are already so 
many unforeseen problems with housing, transportation, food and water supplies, 
that there will be zero tolerance for criminal activity.  
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The residents of New Orleans who were left behind to fend for themselves in 
the hurricane were the “other”, and because the risk was so great, the response was 
great.  The military not only became involved, but became a primary actor. Law 
enforcement officers acted militarily as well, obeying shoot to kill order against 
looters.  The stories of horrific violence and a community in a disarray were 
misrepresented because fear was heightened, and in order to minimize the risk on 
everyone else in surrounding communities, extreme security measure were taken 
against those left behind, while basic relief efforts were neglected.  
Jonathan Simon (2007) writes of a notion he calls governing through crime, 
which essentially means that problems in society are defined through how crime is 
dealt with. Consistently since the 1960’s (when the period of late modernity began) 
crime control is the most important matter. This has always been an efficient 
strategy for lawmakers and leaders, to tell the public they are going to get tough on 
crime. When it comes to natural disasters it does not seem as appropriate, given the 
other more pertinent problems such as amenities for survival, but that is what has 
been happening. The response to Hurricane Katrina exemplifies how crime was used 
as a first response by the government. Almost immediately, residents were on 
lockdown in the Superdome, troops were called in, and within a day reports of 
looting and heinous crimes were spreading through the news circuit. The federal 
government is breeding a society of “eager consumers of public and private 
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governmental tools against crime risk” (Simon, 2007).  Communities will welcome 
military troops, law enforcement officers, National Guard, and private military 
companies into their neighborhoods after a natural disaster because it means they 
are protected.  
Naturally, what happened after Hurricane Katrina did not come about 
unexpectedly or suddenly. The military has always been a part of disaster response, 
simply taking it a few steps further to become the predominant force in attempts to 
quell criminal activity. The time is also right for the public to be accepting of this. Our 
heightened fears about uncertainty and risk have led us to take drastic measures in 
the name of security and safety. We will allow the military into our backyards with 
assault rifles if it means we no longer feel we have to worry about hazards or 
unforeseen dangers.  The irony of this when it comes to natural disasters is that they 
are almost always unforeseen dangers.  A hurricane can change its path at any 
moment; a tornado drops out of the sky with little warning; and wildfires spread 
with the wind. Entrusting armed troops and mercenaries with our safety seems 
more haphazard than risk aversive.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION 
 
This research began as an exploratory study of militarizing all disasters.  
However, natural and man-made disasters combined make up a large body of 
literature, one that could never have been examined with care given the time frame, 
which is why natural disasters became the focal point. One limitation is not being 
able to include other man-made disasters such as oil spills, as these kinds of 
disasters also illustrate the points made in this research.  
Also limiting to this research is the fact that one example was used- Hurricane 
Katrina. This decision was made because this natural disaster embodied all of the 
marked changes that had taken place within disaster response, and showed how 
drastic militarization of disasters could take place. It is certainly not the lone natural 
disaster to involve the military, but it is one of the most memorable of recent 
history. Further research could certainly focus on other types of natural disasters, 
such as wildfires or tornado outbreaks.  
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Militarization of natural disaster response in the United State is a very real 
phenomenon, and one those involved in the study of criminal justice should pay 
attention to, as the primary reason the military has been involved is for policing and 
security. The perception of crime by the public and media, and the reliance on the 
federal government and military to safeguard society in these areas struck by natural 
disasters is of consequence. Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic disaster not only 
because of the Category 5 storm that broke levees and killed thousands, but because 
the response was uncoordinated and unfocused on what should have mattered- 
saving human lives.  The federal government and state and local officials have long 
ago admitted recovery operations were halted to deal with responses to crime. The 
focus on security and criminal behavior in a time of emergency is unnatural, 
happening only because late modern society has expectations and will not tolerate 
even the supposed threat to safety. Disaster response in the United States will 
remain forever changed by what happened in New Orleans, and the role of the 
military shows no signs of stopping expansion into the realm of disaster relief.  
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